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to “productivism”
Ricardo Ffrench-Davis
C ontrary to the belief that the region has found its way to an 
efficient macroeconomic policy, this paper argues that macroeconomic 
failures have been partly responsible for its disappointing economic and 
social performance in recent decades. Producers of gdp have had to cope 
with extremely unstable demand, exchange rates and access to financing, 
which have discouraged productivity and investment. Financial capital 
flows have been a determinant of this macroeconomic instability. This 
paper examines their intrinsically procyclical behaviour and concludes that 
an environment friendly to production development requires countercyclical 
regulation of financial flows. It describes how regulation of aggregate 
demand needs to be reconciled with the evolution of potential gdp, the 
real exchange rate with the current account, and financial flows with a 
far-reaching reform of the capital market reforms, away from “financierism” 
and towards “productivism”.
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The countries of Latin America have introduced deep 
economic reforms in the context of  what came to 
be known as the Washington Consensus, including 
far-reaching trade and financial liberalization, 
privatization and a new fiscal discipline, in the belief  
that this would be enough to ensure stability, economic 
growth and increased well-being. The reality is that 
price stability has been achieved (inflation generally 
under control) over the past two decades, but with 
low average gross domestic product (gdp) growth 
and a high degree of  instability in the real economy, 
i.e., in output and employment.
It is often argued that the region has learned to 
cope effectively with the macroeconomic challenge 
and that its failures are microeconomic. However, the 
fact is that production and employment have been 
affected by large cyclical swings in economic activity, 
overall demand, credit access and exchange rates. 
These are key macroeconomic variables, forming 
the environment in which producers of goods and 
services operate. This article will analyse how the 
volatility of  these macroeconomic variables has 
discouraged capital formation, employment and actual 
productivity. Financial capital flows have played a 
central role here.
Notwithstanding the diversity of  the Latin 
American countries, the direction of fluctuations in 
economic activity, aggregate demand, real exchange 
rates, saving rates, investment and capital flows have 
coincided to a great extent. The synchronicity is 
particularly marked among the majority of large and 
medium-sized countries, with less-developed countries 
showing substantial differences.
The macroeconomic environment is mainly 
the outcome of  the effects and interrelationships 
of  fiscal, monetary and exchange-rate policies, 
domestic capital markets and the capital account. 
In turn, this environment influences the speed and 
stability of  economic growth and the distribution 
of its benefits, chiefly through its effects on capital 
formation and employment. Contrary to what 
tends to be implied by the traditionally very high 
degree of compartmentalization between micro- and 
macroeconomic analyses, the fact is that poverty 
reduction efforts, the degree of equity in a society 
and economic growth are strongly affected by the 
quality of the macroeconomic environment.
The emergence of the global crisis, for all its severe 
recessionary and regressive effects, has had a salutary 
result insofar as it has buttressed arguments for the 
central importance of macroeconomic policymaking 
styles and the need to consider ways of correcting 
current practices (see, for example, Blanchard, 
Dell’Ariccia and Mauro, 2010). This is essential in 
a development strategy designed to achieve growth 
with equity.
The core argument of this article is that there 
is a need to move from the strong “financierist” 
and “short-termist” bias that prevails at present to 
an approach that explicitly prioritizes productive 
development and its effects on equity. This requires an 
integrated approach incorporating the interrelationships 
between the micro- and macroeconomy and taking 
account of the implications of profound structural 
heterogeneity in national markets and the intrinsically 
procyclical nature of  international financial flows. 
One aspect of  this is that the instabilities referred to 
have very different effects on large and small firms, 
on investment and consumption, and on skilled and 
unskilled workers. The gradualism of policies and 
the quality of coordination between their monetary, 
exchange-rate, financial and fiscal aspects, for example, 
make a great difference to economic growth and its 
distributional effects, and particularly the quality 
of  employment.
Interrelationships encompass static and dynamic 
effects. An example of the former are the effects on the 
utilization rate of the productive capacity of labour 
and capital. Fluctuations in this rate have repeatedly 
opened up large gaps between installed capacity or 
potential gdp and the gdp actually generated. These 
gaps, and the volatility of variables such as the real 
exchange rate, have had far-reaching dynamic effects 
on, for example, the investment ratio and its influence 
  I have written a number of texts on macroeconomic policy styles 
in emerging economies since an article published in cepal Review 
No. 60 (1996). The subject is explored further in Ffrench-Davis 
(2006) and (2008), plus versions produced for different events and 
publications. Here I try to summarize what I have learned about 
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on the trend of development; the amount of value 
added to exports and their interrelationship with other 
components of gdp; innovation; the development of 
small and medium-sized enterprises; and formality 
or lack of it in the labour market. Macroeconomic 
policymaking styles have a considerable influence on 
all these variables and have been a crucial factor in 
the very modest 3.2% annual growth rate of regional 
gdp between 1990 and 2008.1
Consequently, while safeguarding the progress 
made with inflation control and fiscal discipline, 
there is a need to progress towards the creation of  a 
macroeconomic environment that is more “friendly” 
to the different agents generating gdp. Section II 
summarizes the achievements and failures of  the 
countries of  Latin America as a group since 1990. 
The variables on which the analysis is focused exhibit 
effects that to a great degree are common to the 
majority of  the population, despite the manifest 
differences between countries. Successes with inflation 
control, fiscal discipline and export dynamism are 
highlighted. There follows an exposition of  how 
these successes have been accompanied by weak 
economic growth and very low levels of  capital 
formation. Section III documents the great instability 
of aggregate demand and exchange rates with which 
the different agents have had to cope and the way this 
has been associated with recurrent external shocks 
1  Ffrench-Davis (2006) examines the reforms and their effects. 
See also idb (1997), World Bank (1997), eclac (1998 and 2000), 
Williamson (2003), World Bank (2005, in an interesting self-critical 
reaction), Rodrik (2006) and Ocampo (2008).
in financial capital flows and, more recently, to the 
terms of trade as well.
Section IV examines the characteristics of financial 
flows and addresses the issue of why these tend to be 
intrinsically procyclical in emerging economies. Section 
V considers the effects of instability, in particular with 
respect to the emergence of recessive gaps between 
potential output or the production frontier and 
actual gdp. This is followed by an analysis of how 
these gaps adversely affect firms’ balance sheets and 
expectations, along with employment. It is shown that 
the main impact of instability in economic activity 
over these years has been on the underutilization 
of  production capacity for the domestic market. 
This is the part of gdp (non-exported gdp) that is 
most dependent on the domestic macroeconomic 
environment, which is what this article is about. Then 
comes an examination of the dynamic consequences of 
the region’s frequent recessions, manifested in falling 
ratios of productive investment and a deteriorating 
employment situation.
Section VI presents policy lessons for a development 
macroeconomics approach with a view to making the 
transition from “financierism” to “productivism”, the 
aim being to contribute more effectively to growth 
with equity. It focuses on fiscal, monetary, exchange-
rate, domestic finance and capital account policies. 
Section VII concludes.
II
deep economic reforms and poor economic 
growth since the 1990s
During the gestation of the so-called Washington 
Consensus, inflation was an extremely serious problem 
in a number of the region’s countries. Consequently, 
the reformers of the 1990s gave priority to combating 
it and imposing fiscal discipline. As one ingredient of 
this, they sought to insulate monetary management 
against pressure from governments running budget 
deficits. This entailed a tendency whereby central banks 
came to operate monetary and exchange-rate policies 
independently of other areas of macroeconomic policy, 
with their actions confined to controlling inflation 
as a “primary if  not exclusive” goal (Blanchard, 
Dell’Ariccia and Mauro, 2010, p. 3).
By the mid-1990s, inflation was under control; 
since 1997, average annual rates have been in single 
digits. Control of inflation was naturally associated 
with substantial improvements to fiscal balances and 
their financing. With these two important achievements 
and the abandonment of public-sector intervention in 
the region’s markets, the approach in fashion assumed 
that economic growth would arise spontaneously (see 
World Bank, 1997; idb, 1997; Fischer, 1993). In parallel 
with macroeconomic achievements, far-reaching 
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liberalization of imports (as one main stimulus for 
exports), domestic financial markets and the capital 
account was expected to play a strategic role as a 
driver of development.
It is clear that, with variations and to differing 
degrees, most of the countries of Latin America met 
these requirements of  neoliberal macroeconomic 
balance as laid down by the Washington Consensus. 
Even the performance of  export volumes was 
satisfactory as they expanded vigorously, growing at 
a rate one third faster than world trade.
Nonetheless, the results in terms of economic 
growth and equity have been poor. As table 1 shows, 
annual gdp growth (which includes production of 
exportables and non-exportables) averaged just 3.2% 
between 1990 and 2008, a far lower rate than East 
Asia’s and similar to that of the United States, whose 
per capita income is four times as high as the region’s. 
These averages include the catch-up of the post-2003 
boom; gdp growth averaged 5.4% in the five years 
from 2004 to 2008, a figure not seen since the 1970s. 
As the boom came to an abrupt halt in 2009, with 
actual output and employment falling because of the 
global crisis, the calculation ends in 2008 so that the 
evaluation and the quantitative data underlying it can 
be focused on more structural aspects.2
The data on gdp variability and the negative effects 
caused by it show that a macroeconomic approach 
focusing on the two pillars referred to (low inflation 
and fiscal discipline) proved unsatisfactory from the 
perspective of stability in the real economy, which is 
where gdp is generated. In fact, sharp fluctuations are 
observed in the gdp growth rate. These fluctuations, 
which affected the great majority of Latin Americans, 
were due not to sudden structural or microeconomic 
changes but to major swings in aggregate demand and 
the exchange rate (which affects its composition), and 
in the expectations or mood of economic actors. All 
of these are macroeconomic variables.
The greatest determinant of these macroeconomic 
changes, which generated recessive gaps between 
2  To sustain the modest average of 3.2% since 1990 through to 
2012, cumulative gdp growth of 15% would be required in the 
three years from 2010 to 2012.
TABLE 1
Latin America (19 countries): gdp growth rates, 1971-2009
(Annual percentage averages)
 1971-1980 1981-1989 1990-1997 1998-2003 2004-2008 1990-2008 2009
Argentina 2.8 -1.0 5.0 -1.3 8.4 4.0 0.9
Brazil 8.6 2.3 2.0 1.5 4.7 2.6 -0.2
Chile 2.5 2.8 7.0 2.7 4.9 5.4 -1.5
Colombia 5.4 3.7 3.9 1.1 5.5 3.6 0.8
Mexico 6.5 1.4 3.1 2.9 3.5 3.1 -6.5
Peru 3.9 -0.7 3.9 2.0 7.6 4.4 0.9
Uruguay 2.7 0.4 3.9 -2.1 8.3 3.2 2.9
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 1.8 -0.3 3.8 -2.7 10.3 3.5 -3.3
Latin America (19)        
Total gdp 5.6 1.3 3.3 1.4 5.4 3.2 -1.9
gdp per worker 1.7 -1.5 0.6 -1.1 3.0 0.6 -3.8
       
Per capita gdp        
Latin America (19) 3.0 -0.8 1.5 -0.2 4.0 1.7 -2.9
Asia (6) 4.9 5.0 5.6 2.0 3.5 3.9 -1.0
United States 2.2 2.4 1.6 2.1 1.4 1.7 -3.3
World 1.9 1.4 1.2 1.3 2.2 1.5 -3.2
Source: prepared on the basis of  data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac), World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund (imf). Figures for 2009 are provisional.
Note: Asia (6) includes the Republic of  Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Taiwan province of  China, excepting 
1971-1980 for the last of  these.
gdp: gross domestic product.
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potential and actual gdp over much of  the 1990-
2009 period, have been cyclical variations in capital 
inflows and outflows.3
The low figures for growth indicate that the per 
capita gdp gap between the region and the developed 
countries has remained very high. The data available 
for 2008 show that per capita gdp in Latin America 
stood at just 27% of the level enjoyed by the inhabitants 
of  the Group of Seven (G-7) and 23% of  that of 
the United States. In addition, an enormous social 
gap remains, as the ratio between the tenth and first 
3  The resulting macroeconomic instability is not only recessionary 
and growth-depressing, but also has a markedly regressive bias 
(eclac, 2010; Ffrench-Davis, 2010b).
income deciles in the Latin American countries is 
almost treble that of the G-7 (a multiple of 34 as 
opposed to 12).
The dynamism of gdp depends on a number of 
factors, a very important one being the investment ratio. 
Spending on equipment and machinery, commercial 
and residential construction and infrastructure, which 
constitute gross fixed capital formation (gfcf), is 
closely associated with the macroeconomic environment 
that productive investors face and anticipate for the 
future. It transpires that the capital formation ratio 
has been remarkably low (see figure 1), compared 
both to that of successful emerging economies and 
to what the region itself  achieved in the 1970s. In 
1990-2008, the gfcf  ratio averaged 18.5% of  gdp, 
as against 23.3% in the 1970s. 
FIGURE 1 
Latin America: gross fixed capital formation, 1971-2009
(Percentages of gdp)
Source: based on data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac). 
Note: In 2000 prices. Figures for 2009 are preliminary. The figures above the horizontal lines are annual averages for the respective 
periods.
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The performance of the Latin American countries 
has been shaped by a macroeconomic environment 
in which the main actors —businesses, workers, 
investors and the State— have had to cope with 
considerable fluctuations in aggregate (or domestic) 
demand, economic activity and macroeconomic 
prices (eclac, 2000, chapter 6; eclac, 2010, chapter 
II; Ffrench-Davis, 2006, chapters I and II). Figure 2 
tellingly illustrates the “rollercoaster” behaviour of 
aggregate demand. 
In these two decades of Washington Consensus 
reforms, the macroeconomy has been a determining 
factor in the volatile and unsatisfactory performance 
of regional output. It can be seen that fluctuations 
in demand are quickly followed by fluctuations in 
gdp; by definition, this involves fluctuations in the 
utilization rate of available capital and labour. If  the 
economy were in macroeconomic balance, meaning 
that there was no substantial “recessive gap” between 
potential gdp (gdp*) and actual gdp (gdpa),4 strong 
and persistent growth in domestic demand (like that 
recorded during the 1990-1994, 1996-1997 and 2004-
2007 periods) would have been followed by a fairly 
steady evolution of the gdp trend and by upsurges in 
inflation and a deterioration in the external balance 
similar to the level of additional growth in aggregate 
demand, and this has not usually happened; instead, 
it has brought upsurges in gdpa, something that 
is possible only if  there is a gap between the two 
measures of gdp.
The conclusion, which has major implications, 
is that since the 1980s the region has routinely been 
operating well below its production frontier, with 
4  This definition of a recessive or output gap differs from the one 
used modally (two consecutive quarters of falling gdp). The modal 
definition seems relevant in economies with small fluctuations in 
economic activity, but not in the countries of Latin America.
III
Price stability versus instability  
in the real economy
FIGURE 2
Latin America (19 countries): aggregate demand and gdp, 1990-2009
(Annual percentage growth rates)
Source: R. Ffrench-Davis, Reforming Latin America’s Economies after Market Fundamentalism, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, 
and updated figures from Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac), Time for equality: closing gaps, 
opening trails (LC/G.2432(SES.33/3)), Santiago, Chile, May 2010, figure II.5, for 19 countries.
gdp: gross domestic product.
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fluctuations that have carried output closer to or further 
from potential gdp, but without this ever remaining 
there. When gdpa has come close to gdp*, it has 
usually been accompanied by large external deficits 
influenced by excessive currency appreciation. This 
represents a serious macroeconomic imbalance.
Whereas aggregate demand fluctuations prior 
to the 1990s were often due to fiscal deficits financed 
by printing money, it can be said as a rule that 
recent fluctuations have mainly been caused by 
external shocks in the capital account and terms of 
trade. Figure 3 presents an index of  external shocks 
suffered by the region, including fluctuations in the 
terms of  trade and net capital flows (net resource 
transfers) and their relationship with the evolution 
of  aggregate demand.
One very important point is that, in many 
countries, fluctuations in the excess of  spending 
over output (i.e., the external deficit) have largely 
been confined to the private sector.5 The fact that 
5  The transition towards imbalance has not started in national 
economies but has usually been caused by a positive external 
financial shock. The combination of growing external deficits with 
the build-up of international reserves during upturns is evidence 
of  this. Following the initial external shock, the flow tends to
the fiscal accounts have become more stable and 
balanced allows the conclusion that instability in 
aggregate demand and the external balance is mainly 
a private-sector problem, as documented by Marfán 
(2005). This does not mean that fiscal policy has 
been fully balanced, efficient or effective in serving 
development and combating inequality; it simply 
means that procyclical fluctuations in the external 
balance have been concentrated more in the private 
sector than in the public accounts.
This behaviour has generally been due to the 
signals arising from the combination of a large supply 
of  external financing and permissive, procyclical 
domestic macroeconomic policies (Kaminsky, 
Reinhart and Vegh, 2004; Ocampo, 2007), many of 
them being lauded by the financial markets and risk 
rating agencies.
An adjustment process similar to the one seen 
in 1990-1994 and 1996-1997 took place again in 
2004-2008, although with a boom essentially driven 
become endogenous as a result of procyclical domestic monetary 
and exchange-rate policies. An examination of different national 
episodes reinforces these conclusions for the region as a whole. 
See Ffrench-Davis (2006), chapter VII.
FIGURE 3
Latin America (19 countries): external shocks and aggregate 
demand growth, 1990-2009
(Percentages of gdp, annual growth rates)
Source: R. Ffrench-Davis, Reforming Latin America’s Economies after Market Fundamentalism, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, 
and updated figures, based on official data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac).
Note: External shocks include net transfers of  resources from abroad plus the terms-of-trade effect, both measured as percentages 
of  gross domestic product (gdp). Net resource transfers include net capital flows (including errors and omission) plus the net factor 
income balance plus the net current transfers balance, excluding emigrants’ remittances.
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on this occasion by improvements in the terms of 
trade. A substantial part of this improvement involved 
higher public revenues, reflected in a reduction of 
public liabilities and sometimes the establishment 
of stabilization funds, with a rising primary fiscal 
surplus between 2003 and 2007 (eclac, 2009a and 
2010, chapter II). The scale of  the terms-of-trade 
improvement meant that the region had a substantial 
current account surplus at that time. The region was 
better placed now than in the two previous cycles, 
thanks to the build-up in its own resources and 
the reduction of liabilities. Consequently, when the 
external balance abruptly reversed in 2008-2009 with 
the international financial crisis, many of the region’s 
governments were able to implement countercyclical 
policies to mitigate the recessionary and regressive 
effects of contagion (eclac, 2009a). 
In parallel with their repercussions for aggregate 
demand, each of the cycles of expansion in the supply 
of external financing tended to generate a process of 
currency appreciation in most of the Latin American 
countries. Expectations of  persistent appreciation 
encouraged financial agents, operating within the 
time horizon of the appreciation outlook for local 
currencies, to channel additional funds into the region.6 
The experience of the Latin American countries has 
been that the real exchange rate, a macroprice that is 
vital to decisions about production and spending on 
tradables, has behaved in an extremely procyclical way. 
Exchange-rate movements have been strongly correlated 
with cyclical financial capital flows (eclac, 2010, 
figure II.8). Every upsurge in the supply of funding 
has routinely led to large currency appreciations, 
and these have repeatedly resulted in overshooting 
of the current account. The combination of an open 
capital account, large liquid liabilities and emerging 
expectations of depreciation have led to large-scale and 
usually sudden capital outflows, generally accompanied 
by traumatic devaluations, once the markets have 
become aware of these vulnerabilities.
An outstanding implication for policy design is 
that a development strategy that is supposed to be 
led by exporting success cannot entrust the setting 
of the exchange rate to the “short-termist” behaviour 
of some financial agents; opting for this approach 
denotes a severe policy inconsistency.
6  If  appreciation is seen as lasting, this process will tend to 
discourage investment in the production of  tradables that are 
intensive in local inputs. Consequently, it is very important to 
observe what happens to exchange rates during the expansionary 
phase or boom. This is when external imbalances and currency 
and maturity mismatches tend to arise.
7  See Fanelli (2003), Frenkel (2003) and Reisen (2003) for 
complementary analyses.
IV
intrinsically procyclical financial flows
An outstanding feature of  recent macroeconomic 
crises in East Asia and Latin America is that they 
have affected economies classified as “successful” 
by international financial institutions, financial 
agents and risk rating agencies.7 As a consequence, 
emerging economies have been “rewarded” with large 
flows of  private capital and diminishing spreads, in 
parallel with a build-up of  increasing volumes of 
external liabilities.
The Latin American countries have thus moved 
into areas of vulnerability: varying combinations of 
growing and highly liquid external liabilities; domestic 
credit booms; currency and maturity mismatches; 
substantial external deficits; appreciated exchange 
rates; high stock market price/earnings ratios; high 
prices for luxury real estate; low rates of productive 
investment. At the same time, macroeconomic 
expectations have largely come to be dictated by the 
opinions of agents specializing in short-term segments 
of the financial market.
There is a very substantive literature on sources 
of  financial instability: information asymmetries 
between lenders and borrowers and a failure to 
properly assimilate the negative externalities generated 
by each agent (in the form of growing vulnerability) 
have created the basis for cycles of abundance and 
scarcity of external financing (Krugman, 2000; Rodrik, 
1998; Stiglitz, 2000; Harberger, 1985). As Heymann 
(2000) and Ocampo (2007) have emphasized, finance 
deals with the future, and concrete “information” 
about this is obviously not available. The tendency to 
equate opinions and expectations with “information” 
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contributes to a herd mentality and to multiple 
equilibria. And there have in fact been episodes 
of  runaway contagion, first of  excessive optimism 
and then of  excessive pessimism, in the financial 
crises experienced over the last three decades, these 
imbalances often being encouraged by the risk rating 
agencies (Reisen, 2003).
An obvious contagion of overoptimism among 
lenders tends to be categorized as risk “appetite” among 
the agents following the “leaders”, but what prevails 
is ignorance or underestimation of the underlying 
risks.8 Meanwhile, as discussed below, the “leaders” 
tend not so much to have a particular appetite for risk 
as to believe that capital gains are assured. As regards 
borrowers, at times of overoptimism the evidence is 
that most of them do not borrow with the intention 
of not repaying or in the hope of being bailed out or 
benefiting from a moratorium. What usually prevail are 
rather expectations of large benefits —from continued 
currency appreciation, for example. Borrowers also 
fall victim to financial euphoria during booms.
Beyond these factors, two further characteristics of 
financial creditors are of vital relevance in explaining 
why they tend to exhibit intrinsically procyclical 
behaviour. One is the particular nature of  the 
leaders acting on the supply side. There are natural 
asymmetries in the behaviour and goals of different 
economic agents. Agents oriented towards the financial 
markets are specialists in liquid investment, operate 
within short time horizons and thus are extremely 
sensitive to changes in the variables affecting short-
term returns.
The second characteristic is the gradual spread of 
information about investment opportunities in emerging 
economies among agents who are in a position to 
expand supply. Agents in the different financial market 
segments are gradually attracted to new international 
markets as they learn of profitable opportunities in 
emerging economies that they had hitherto overlooked 
or been unaware of. This explains, on the supply side, 
why capital flows into the countries of Latin America 
(in 1977-1981, 1991-1994, 1995-1997 and 2004-2007) 
have followed a growth path over periods of several 
years rather than there being sudden one-off upward 
shifts in the supply of capital.
Feedback effects have been generated by the 
existence of installed capacity (potential gdp) that has 
been underused at the start of each of these processes 
and gradually brought back into operation during 
the upturn; this is something the authorities, markets 
and certain econometricians have often wrongly 
interpreted as a persistent structural increase in total 
factor productivity (tfp).9 All this is self-reinforcing 
so that some variables – stock markets, exchange 
rates, risk ratings and real-estate prices – can move 
in a particular direction, first recovering and then 
overshooting so that they move away from sustainable 
equilibria for prolonged periods, offering economic 
agents the “assurance” that financial markets will 
move in only one direction and stimulating capital 
flows that pursue capital gains (rent-seeking flows).
This being so, it is important to highlight the 
significance for public policy design of the distinction 
between two different types of volatility in financial 
capital flows: short-term or random walk fluctuations 
and medium-term instability. The latter means that 
variables such as the exchange rate, stocks and 
shares and real-estate prices can move persistently 
in a particular direction, giving the market the false 
assurance already mentioned of asset prices and returns 
moving in a single direction. This stimulates further 
continuing flows that at some point become increasingly 
detrimental to macroeconomic fundamentals, but 
that still offer successive short-term windfall gains. 
These agents naturally specialize in the search for 
capital gains rather than productivity gains, until 
asset prices and the real exchange rate reach what 
are clearly outlying levels. Then someone sounds 
the alarm and there is a rush to reverse flows, with a 
strong and costly procyclical bias. Unlike fixed capital 
investment, which is to a large degree irreversible, this 
financial capital is wholly reversible.
Lenders’ sensitivity to bad news will increase 
greatly at some point (and probably quite suddenly) 
once the country has entered “areas of vulnerability”. 
Then lenders will take note of: (i) the volume of assets 
they hold in that market, (ii) the degree to which that 
market depends on additional net flows, something 
that is connected to the current account deficit, (iii) the 
level of exchange-rate appreciation, (iv) share price/
earnings ratios and (v) the country’s stock of short-
term and liquid liabilities. It is therefore unsurprising 
9  A systematic distinction between potential gdp and actual gdp 
would allow this faulty interpretation to be avoided, being an essential 
component of a development-oriented macroeconomic policy.
8  Calvo and Mendoza (2000) examine how globalization can 
spur contagion by discouraging the collection of information as it 
creates stronger incentives to imitate the portfolio of the market. 
This introduces a new information asymmetry, this time between 
market “leaders” and “followers”.
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that expectations become more and more likely to 
reverse as valuations move further into these areas 
of vulnerability.
The deeper and longer-lasting an economy’s 
incursion into areas of vulnerability, the greater the 
likelihood of crises and the severer their effects. This 
highlights the vital need to apply effective regulations 
to ensure that capital flows strengthen productive 
investment and are consistent with a sustainable 
macroeconomic environment. The composition, 
volume and deviation from trend of the flows are 
crucial variables. Against a background of ubiquitous 
structural heterogeneity, the explanation lies in the 
differing capacity for action and reaction of  the 
agents typically operating in the different domestic 
markets.
To sum up, the interaction between two factors 
—the nature of agents and that of the adjustment 
process— accounts for the dynamic of capital flows 
over time: the factors leading suppliers to continue 
providing funds even when the real macroeconomic 
fundamentals are deteriorating.
Consequently, both the accumulation of external 
assets by providers of finance until this expansionary 
stage of  the cycle is far advanced and the sudden 
subsequent reversal of  flows can be considered 
“rational” responses by individual agents, given their 
short-term horizons. This is because the question 
of whether the real fundamentals are improving or 
worsening is not relevant to these investors as long 
as they continue to make investments motivated by 
expectations of short-term returns. What does matter 
to them is whether the indicators which are critical 
from their standpoint —real-estate, bond and share 
prices and the exchange rate— can continue to yield 
short-term gains and, of course, whether markets are 
liquid enough for them to reverse their decisions in a 
timely fashion if necessary. They will thus continue to 
originate net flows until expectations of an imminent 
reversal emerge.
It needs to be stressed again that, for financial 
operators, the most relevant variables are not the 
long-term fundamentals of the country’s economy 
but the short-term returns it yields. This explains why 
their view of a particular country can alter swiftly 
and radically even though its economic fundamentals, 
other than foreign-currency liquidity, may remain 
unaltered even as financiers’ mood switches from 
overblown optimism to overblown pessimism.
Once debtor markets have made a “sufficient” 
downward adjustment, of course, the opposite process 
arises and can be sustained for some years, examples 
being 1991-1994 and 1995-1997, and probably the 
aftermath of  the global crisis of  2008-2009. In 
conclusion, economic agents specializing in financial 
investments, who might be highly efficient in their field, 
operate with short-term planning horizons because 
of their training and the rewards they can thereby 
obtain, and they have largely dictated macroeconomic 
developments owing to the decisive influence they 
have had on policy design in the countries of Latin 
America. This means that a “financierist” attitude 
prevails over the “productivist” approach, and this 
enters into conflict with the twofold objective of 
growth with equity, which requires better incentives 
to increase productivity rather than giving priority 
to financial rent-seeking or capital gains. For growth 
with equity to be sustainably achieved, the views and 
priorities of the different economic and social actors 
need to be brought back into balance.
The heterogeneity characterizing the capital 
account in the recent era of financial globalization 
makes it essential to distinguish between the behaviour 
and effects of its different components. Greenfield 
direct foreign investment and long-term credits 
associated with imports of capital goods are relatively 
stable over the cycle, and are indissolubly linked to 
productive investment. By contrast, financial flows 
have shown great procyclical volatility, and this very 
property of theirs means that only a small share of 
them have gone into the financing of  productive 
investment (Uthoff and Titelman, 1998); these flows 
usually end up financing purchases of existing assets 
and consumption, creating bubbles and crowding out 
national savings. Often, indeed, they have destabilized 
the macroeconomy instead of stabilizing it, and have 
not contributed to productive capital formation.10
10  Opposing positions in two important papers published by the 
International Monetary Fund (imf) appear in Prasad and others 
(2003) and Singh (2006).
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Real macroeconomic instability has recessionary and 
regressive effects, associated with price inflexibility, 
incomplete factor markets and the deep structural 
heterogeneity of  the region’s economies. The 
consequences, over the cycle, are various. One of 
them, the most standard in the literature although 
somewhat overlooked during these years of neoliberal 
fashion, is an increased disparity between aggregate 
supply and demand, the result being a recurrent 
gap between potential production capacity and its 
utilization, particularly in the stop phases that follow 
go phases. Demand is restrained in some sectors by 
full capacity utilization, while in others it is markedly 
inadequate. Consequently, in a stop-and-go situation, 
the instability of overall demand inevitably means 
that average net utilization is lower than production 
capacity and that actual productivity is lower than 
it would be in a situation of  stable proximity to 
the production frontier. The greater the instability, 
obviously, the larger the recessive output gap and the 
worse the effects on the labour market, with increasing 
informality (eclac, 2010, chapter V).
1. Structurally heterogeneous markets 
and instability
The connection between inequality and instability in 
the real macroeconomy stems from the great structural 
heterogeneity characterizing developing economies. 
This includes the differing capacity for action and 
reaction of the agents typically found in different market 
segments (large versus small businesses, high- versus 
low-skilled workers, productive or gdp-generating 
investors versus financial investors or buyers of existing 
assets, productive investors versus consumers) and 
the asymmetries between their respective responses to 
the instability of economic activity and macroprices. 
During upturns (as opposed to a relatively stable trend 
in economic activity), liquidity constraints tend to 
be relaxed faster for consumers than for productive 
investors, given the weakness of the long-term segments 
of capital markets. Again, consumers can react faster 
than productive investors because the latter need to 
identify, design and develop new projects, which is a 
lengthy process. Furthermore, the irreversibility of 
investment means that favourable expectations have 
to be perceived as sustainable by long-term investors 
before these begin new investment processes.
The production frontier obviously sets a bound to 
the recovery of actual gdp; only for short periods can 
this exceed potential gdp. During recessions, conversely, 
actual gdp can fall well short of potential gdp for 
long periods. Consequently, economic instability is 
intrinsically asymmetrical and, on average, inevitably 
entails underutilization of potential productivity and 
lower actual output. Recovery increases the flow of 
present output until the point where existing capacity 
is fully utilized, but output not generated in the past 
cannot be recovered. As long as the recessionary gap 
between the two levels persists, so will the depressive 
effects on productive investment, the labour market and 
the situation of small and medium-sized enterprises 
and informal sectors.
In consequence, the size of  the gap between 
actual demand and the production frontier has major 
static and dynamic effects. First, it affects observed 
productivity (actual tfp) and the returns on projects 
implemented. Second, higher capital utilization rates 
generally mean that the average employment level 
is higher and the workforce interacts with a larger 
stock of physical capital in use. The consequent rise 
in observed productivity means that the welfare of 
workers and investors (wages and profits) can improve 
immediately, by virtue of the higher average capacity 
utilization index. Fiscal revenues also rise. The usual 
thing is for poverty to diminish in these situations, 
while the probability of  an income distribution 
improvement rises during the recovery stage. The sign 
of the distributive effect depends on the micro- and 
mesoeconomic reforms accompanying recovery. Growth 
in itself may be either progressive or regressive. In the 
first case, it is usually sustainable and increasingly 
“endogenized”, in the second it tends to be reversible 
and limited (Bourguignon and Walton, 2007). 
11  A report prepared for the International Labour Organization 
(ilo) examines the effects of this instability, which are likewise 
regressive (Ffrench-Davis, 2010b).
V
The recessionary and growth-depressing effects 
of instability in the real macroeconomy11
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2. recessive gaps and the dynamics 
of capital formation
In the dynamic dimension, the degree of  stability 
has a number of effects on the construction of the 
future. Higher utilization indices and the consequent 
increase in average actual productivity (in conventional 
econometrics this would appear as an increase in tfp) 
will tend to stimulate investment in new capacity. The 
dynamic effect on the investment ratio will be much 
more substantial if  solid expectations are generated 
among economic actors regarding the ability of public 
policies to keep actual demand close to the production 
frontier, and if the authorities additionally undertake 
reforms to complete long-term capital markets while 
at the same time taking steps to improve labour force 
training and innovation.
Figure 4 shows the close relationship that has 
existed between the recessive gap and the investment 
ratio in Latin America, reflecting one of the main 
negative dynamic effects of the underutilization of 
production factors. This relationship is accounted 
for by a number of reasons (Ffrench-Davis, 2006, 
chapter III; Aizenman and Marion, 1999): (i) a 
large idle capacity naturally discourages investment 
in new productive assets; (ii) an environment in 
which economic activity and the exchange rate are 
volatile discourages irreversible investment; (iii) 
underutilization means lower profits and a lack of 
internally generated funding, usually coinciding too 
with a reluctance by the capital market to finance 
firms that have liquidity problems in recessions; 
(iv) the recessionary gap and its fluctuations tend 
to affect the quality of  project evaluation; (v) the 
disincentives to the acquisition of new machinery 
and equipment dampen the technological innovation 
associated with these; and (vi) large recessionary 
fluctuations tend to depress public revenue, leading to 
cuts in the public investment needed to complement 
private investment (Easterly and Servén, 2003).
Figure 4 also shows the relevance of continuity 
in recovery processes and of  the sustainability of 
FIGURE 4
Latin America (9 countries): the recessive gap and gross investment ratio, 
1990-2009
Source: R. Ffrench-Davis, Reforming Latin America’s Economies after Market Fundamentalism, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006, and updated figures from Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac), Time for equality: closing 
gaps, opening trails (LC/G.2432(SES.33/3)), Santiago, Chile, May 2010, figure II.9, based on data from eclac and A. Hofman and 
H. Tapia, “Potential output in Latin America: a standard approach for the 1950-2000 period”, Estudios estadísticos y prospectivos 
series, No. 25 (LC/L.2042-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac), 2003. United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.03.II.G.205.
Note: Includes Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of  Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru and Plurinational 
State of  Bolivia. The investment ratio measures the proportion between gross fixed capital formation and actual gdp. The recessive 
output gap measures the difference between actual gross domestic product (gdp) and potential gross domestic product (gdp*) as a 
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the equilibria that arise as the recessionary gap is 
progressively closed. It reveals that more prolonged 
periods of economic recovery have led to an ongoing 
escalation of  the investment ratio. The two-year 
period 2007-2008, when investment ratios were at 
their highest since the 1970s, followed the prolonged 
recovery that had begun in 2003; thereafter, with the 
contagion from the crisis, the ratio shed two of the 
percentage points it had gained up to 2008.
The case of Chile well illustrates the effects of 
the macroeconomic environment on investment. 
After averaging about 15% of  gdp in the 1970s and 
1980s, and following a recessive adjustment in 1990, 
the ratio recovered steadily to gain about 8 points by 
1998 (Ffrench-Davis, 2010c). The persistence of the 
process is a crucial factor in effectively stimulating 
investors to tie up their funds and credit for the long 
periods production activity requires.
Paradoxically, fluctuations in the capital formation 
ratio have responded far more to economic cycles than 
to the micro- and mesoeconomic reforms carried out in 
the region to raise productivity and reduce structural 
heterogeneity. Assuming the macroeconomy were 
performing well, micro- and mesoeconomic reforms 
would be expected to determine the evolution of the 
investment ratio.
Consequently, there is a clear link between 
volatility and long-run economic growth that operates 
via its effects on the volume of fixed capital investment. 
Capital formation, in fact, functions as a major variable 
in the evolution of potential gdp, feeding through to 
employment and tfp (Ffrench-Davis, 2006, figures 
III.1 and III.2; De Long and Summers, 1991). The 
unsatisfactory experience of the region by comparison 
with the Asian countries can be attributed not just to 
the crucial issue of productive development policies, 
but to macroeconomic failures and the nature of the 
Washington Consensus capital market reforms (see 
section VI).
3. The instability of a crucial macroprice: 
the exchange rate
Section III discussed the exchange-rate instability that 
has been generated by financial flows. This instability 
in the real exchange rate has been detrimental to 
the growth and diversification of  exports and their 
integration into domestic economies (Agosin, 2007). 
Rates that fluctuate so much cannot be taken as 
effective reflections of  shifting levels of  “sustainable 
equilibrium”; “sustainable equilibrium” levels 
respond to the evolution of  relative productivity 
between the domestic economy and trading partners 
(and to volumes of  net capital inflows that are 
sustainable and can be absorbed efficiently). The 
changes these “structural” variables undergo are 
usually gradual rather than sudden. Consequently, 
the large swings in many countries’ real exchange 
rates have generally been misalignments caused by 
procyclical capital flows.
Repeated cycles of  currency appreciation, 
particularly after the substantial import liberalization 
that took place in the region (eclac, 1998, chapter V), 
meant that with each upturn, recovering aggregate 
demand from both individuals and firms has been 
increasingly import-intensive. Alongside a welcome 
increase in imports of capital goods, there have been 
large rises in other imports, many of them competing 
with savings and the output of local small and medium-
sized enterprises (smes); thus, not only have the volume 
and quality of exports been crowded out, but so have 
production sectors that compete with imports.
4. Systemic competitiveness and the real 
macroeconomy
It is meaningful for the analysis to examine where 
fluctuations in economic activity have been located. 
Between the 1990-1997 and 1998-2003 periods, for 
example, 90% of  the adjustment in the region’s gdp 
growth (a fall of  1.9 points in the average growth 
rate) was concentrated in production for the domestic 
market, i.e., gdp that is not exported (Ffrench-Davis, 
2006, chapter VI; eclac, 2010, chapter II). This 
reflects two facts, one micro, the other macro. The 
micro fact is the difficulty of  repeatedly reallocating 
resources from the production of non-tradable goods 
to that of  exportable goods and import substitutes 
and back. Switching policies in the region have 
been weakened by liberalization and changes in 
international trade institutions (eclac, 1998; Rodrik, 
2008). Consequently, the main instrument actually 
available, namely the exchange rate, has become far 
more important. To decline to regulate it by permitting 
it to float freely without intervention by the economic 
authority is in stark contradiction with a strategy of 
export-led development.
The second point is macroeconomic. The gdp 
share which is not exported (about four fifths) depends 
on the local macroeconomic environment, while 
exports depend more on the global macroeconomy. 
The information available indicates that national 
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markets have been the main victims of  instability 
(Ffrench-Davis, 2006, chapter V).12 Here once again 
it is possible to appreciate the deficient quality of 
macroeconomic policy in the region, where it has 
been run very procyclically and has thus amplified 
rather than softened the transmission of  external 
trade and financial shocks. The progress made over 
recent years remains insufficient.
13  eclac (2010, chapter II) examines these different macroeconomic 
policies. Ffrench-Davis (2008) provides a fuller analysis.
12  Vigorous growth means that non-exported gdp also expands 
fast. This has been the experience of emerging economies with an 
export model that has been successful in productive development, 
examples being the Republic of Korea for several decades and Chile
VI
development macroeconomics:
from “financierism” to “productivism”
Premature, indiscriminate and poorly sequenced 
liberalization of  domestic financial markets and 
the capital account has become a source of costly 
destabilizing shocks. The high costs generated by 
economic cycles in the Latin American countries 
are related, as has been demonstrated, to the close 
links forged between domestic financial markets and 
procyclical segments of the international financial 
markets. As liberalization has taken place, there has 
been a major upsurge in financial saving without any 
increase in domestic saving, with a very low investment 
ratio and large fluctuations in economic activity 
and employment. The central cause is a financial 
market overly dominated by agents specializing in 
the short term rather than in productive investment. 
Consequently, only a small share of capital inflows 
have financed productive investment, a shortcoming 
aggravated by the financial and currency crises to which 
their volatility has given rise, and whose recessive 
effects have weighed down on capital formation by 
local companies and employment.
A consistent set of countercyclical fiscal, monetary, 
exchange-rate, domestic financial market and capital 
account policies is essential to foster a macroeconomic 
environment that allows potential gdp to be fully utilized 
and encourages the generation of new capacity.13 For 
this to happen, such a development-friendly environment 
needs to be complemented by efforts to “complete” 
markets for capital, labour and innovation.
In economies that are highly vulnerable to 
external shocks, relying on just one particular 
policy instrument during adjustment processes can 
produce macroeconomic outcomes inferior to what 
can be achieved by the balanced implementation of 
the different macroeconomic policies. Distributing 
the adjustment across different policies usually 
yields superior macroeconomic outcomes in terms 
of macroprices that are more closely aligned with 
sustainable levels and actual gdp that is consistently 
closer to its potential.
Procyclical, volatile flows are a component of 
external funding, which includes the foreign savings 
required to supplement domestic savings if a substantial 
increase in the investment ratio is to be achieved. An 
“all or nothing” option is therefore not viable. Thus, 
a fundamental goal of macroeconomic policies (and 
of reforms to domestic financial markets) should be 
to reap the potential benefits of external savings in 
support of national development, while moderating the 
intensity of capital account cycles and their negative 
effects on domestic economic and social variables.
1. Fiscal policy
The international financial crisis has revealed the 
central importance of fiscal policy as a macroeconomic 
stabilization tool (Krugman, 2009; Griffith-Jones, 
Ocampo and Stiglitz, 2009; Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia 
between 1990 and 1998, when non-exported output grew by 6.5% 
a year (Ffrench-Davis, 2010c, table VII.6). In Latin America as a 
whole, on the other hand, non-exported output grew by a mere 
2.7% (eclac, 2010, table II.2).
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and Mauro, 2010). The concept of  structural 
fiscal balance is an outstanding component of any 
countercyclical policy package. Its essential feature 
is budgetary measurement over the economic cycle 
to estimate what level of public spending would be 
consistent with trend public-sector revenue or full 
employment of  productive capacity. Stabilizing 
spending in this way makes it more efficient and 
insulates it from cyclical fluctuations in fiscal revenue, 
while mitigating or removing the procyclical bias of 
an annually balanced budget policy. A number of 
countries in the region have been developing a form 
of  budgetary planning that is not constrained by 
narrow annual limits. Chile is a particular example 
(Ffrench-Davis, 2010a).
Part of  an approach of  this kind is the creation 
of stabilization funds for fiscal revenues from exports 
whose prices are highly unstable. These funds can 
help to stabilize normal fiscal expenditure, provide 
supplementary financing for crisis situations like 
that of  2009, and additionally stabilize markets 
for foreign exchange by regulating its supply. For 
this, there is once again an essential need for close 
coordination between the fiscal authorities and 
those responsible for exchange-rate policy, which 
are usually based in different institutions (Martner 
and Tromben, 2004).
2. monetary policy
Even if  the countercyclical role of  fiscal policy is 
successfully enhanced, however, this will not usually 
be enough. A crucial fact in the region is that fiscal 
spending accounts for only a fraction (around a 
fifth) of aggregate demand. Little will be achieved 
by operating an active fiscal policy over the cycle if  
other policies with a great influence on private-sector 
spending are dependent upon volatile flows and the 
opinions of procyclical financial agents.
Monetary policy, along with the independence 
achieved as regards financing of the fiscal balance, 
has been key to the large reduction in inflation rates. 
However, price stabilization can go together with large 
variations in the gap between potential and actual 
gdp (Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro, 2010), as 
has been clearly demonstrated in practice. One critical 
feature of  monetary policy is the weighting given 
to each macroeconomic variable in the work of the 
central bank; another is the coordination with other 
economic authorities already referred to. In a region 
where inflation is mainly in single digits, the tendency 
for central banks to ignore other macroeconomic goals 
has lost the justification it might have had in earlier 
contexts of fiscal irresponsibility and high inflation. 
Mediocre outcomes as regards growth, employment 
and capital formation can be partly explained by the 
way these have been left out in the cold by policies that 
have focused on inflation targets without adequately 
considering the effects on these other areas that have 
such a critical direct impact on development.
For monetary policy to be genuinely countercyclical 
and contribute to development, explicit account must 
be taken of its repercussions on other macroeconomic 
variables such as economic activity, the recessive 
gap, external equilibrium and employment, with 
a sustainable balance between different objectives 
and the pursuit of indispensable coordination with 
fiscal policy rather an exclusive concentration on 
maximizing anti-inflation effects. Real exchange rates 
are a macroeconomic variable that has brought severe 
conflict with anti-inflation policy. Inflation targets 
have frequently been met thanks to exchange-rate 
appreciation that has destabilized the economy.
3. Exchange-rate policy
The exchange rate is a macroeconomic variable that 
is essential for the sustainability of macroeconomic 
equilibria and resource allocation. Conventional 
approaches whereby the only exchange-rate options 
are a fixed nominal rate or a completely free float 
assume that the market will benignly set a sustainable 
equilibrium real exchange rate. Formally, a number of 
the region’s countries have adopted a free exchange-
rate regime. Although central banks have intervened 
on a number of occasions to dampen fluctuations, 
real exchange rates have responded very strongly to 
changes in the balance of payments, more so than 
to changes in the current account.
Although the predominance of  free-floating 
regimes prevented the kind of  currency crises 
characteristic of  fixed-rate regimes, many of  the 
region’s currencies became extremely sensitive to 
procyclical changes in the supply of external funding. 
A severe contradiction therefore arose, with serious 
negative consequences for resource allocation and, 
especially, accumulation. Reforms to liberalize 
imports ushered in a leading role for tradable sectors, 
which meant that the exchange rate became crucial 
to international competitiveness (Williamson, 2000; 
Agosin, 2007; Rodrik, 2008; Eichengreen, 2008). 
Paradoxically, the authorities adopted a policy that 
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led to volatile exchange rates, dominated by short-
term financial operators.
This obviously distorts project evaluation, 
encourages speculative rather than productive 
investment, artificially crowds out local production 
of importable tradables (many produced by SMEs) 
and discourages producers from adding value 
to exports.
This serious failure of exchange-rate policy is a 
severe constraint on export-led development strategies, 
particularly as regards non-traditional exports and those 
with greater value added that generate externalities and 
interact with smes. The management of exchange-rate 
policy is an essential component of the set of variables 
required for success in this area.
Intermediate regimes involving managed exchange-
rate flexibility, such as different varieties of crawling 
pegs, dirty floats or both, represent a serious pragmatic 
attempt to correct this contradiction (Williamson, 
2000). Neoliberal approaches tend to represent any 
exchange-rate intervention as going against “the 
market” and being doomed to failure. However, the 
idea behind the alternative approach we favour is to 
ensure that the real forces of the market —producers 
of  exportables and importers and producers of 
importables, who are the major players in trade for 
production development and equity— are the ones 
that prevail in the setting of the exchange rate. This 
is the “market” that ought to set rates, rather than 
the market of short-term operators and rent-seekers 
imposing their interests over those of the drivers of 
innovation and productivity increases. Consistent, 
selective intervention by the economic authority 
is essential for this, even though it is obviously not 
infallible. It is always necessary to weigh the risk of 
mistakes when acting against the high likelihood of 
error when the exchange rate is left to float freely in 
a context of large flows of procyclical funds.
In summary, exchange-rate policy requires a 
far-reaching correction if  it is to be consistent with 
a development strategy in which the production of 
tradable goods and services plays a central role. This 
would also contribute to systemic competitiveness, 
i.e., to the development of production capacity for 
both the domestic and external markets. The domestic 
market is home to the great majority of workers and 
firms. Improved systemic competitiveness achieved 
in this way helps to reduce domestic structural 
heterogeneity, a precondition for greater equality in 
the labour market and between the array of different-
sized business.
4. Creating deeper capital markets to finance 
development
As this article has emphasized, the capital market 
has a major influence on macroeconomic equilibria, 
employment and capital formation. This is due to two 
features of the region’s economies. A very prominent 
one, first, is the “incompleteness” of capital markets, 
with some segments weak or non-existent. The 
distributive and resource allocation effects of capital 
market failures are aggravated by the marked structural 
heterogeneity between different economic agents, to 
the detriment of smes, low-skilled workers, innovation 
and agents with limited assets. Heterogeneity in access 
to financing reinforces inequalities in productive 
capabilities and participation in broader markets, in 
a vicious circle that condemns less well-capitalized 
production units to vulnerability and makes it hard 
for them to grow.
The close relationship with more volatile 
international financial markets that has been a feature 
of recent decades has exacerbated these shortcomings 
and bears part of the responsibility for low levels of 
productive investment and the fragility of  labour 
markets. Indeed, that link has contributed to an 
intensification of instability.
(a) From the Washington Consensus to innovative 
development financing
Where interest rates and maturities are concerned, 
high financial costs have been the rule. Instead of 
“deep markets” for investment financing, as the 
neoliberal approach expected, the result has been 
markets that are deeply segmented and excessively 
focused on the short term (Stallings and Studart, 
2005). The Washington Consensus reforms to 
domestic capital markets have actually tended 
to weaken development banking and the long-
term segment. Consequently, these reforms have 
not been characterized by consistency with the 
recommendations of  the Monterrey Consensus 
(United Nations, 2007), whose goal was to increase the 
resources going to economic and social development 
and give an effectively inclusive and countercyclical 
character to the working of  capital markets.
National financial systems were certainly quite 
imperfect and inadequate before the Washington 
Consensus reforms, notwithstanding which they 
financed a higher investment ratio in the 1970s 
than was achieved under the neoliberal reforms, 
and supported substantially higher gdp growth 
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(see table 1 and figure 1). It would be unwise in the 
extreme to ignore these two realities and the contrast 
between them.
Consequently, the reform to the reform of national 
financial systems should be aimed at channelling 
resources into savings and productive investment, which 
generates sustainable jobs. The institutional structure 
required includes a vigorous long-term intermediation 
segment to allocate savings to productive investment, 
and there need to be prudential and countercyclical 
regulations. This system needs to include an active 
role for public- and private-sector development banks 
(eclac, 2010). 
In emerging economies like those of  Latin 
America, domestic markets are extremely difficult to 
reform when the capital account is indiscriminately 
open. Effective and efficient countercyclical regulation 
of  the capital account emerges as an unavoidable 
condition of  progress towards a development 
macroeconomics, with space for monetary policy 
and exchange-rate sustainability (Ffrench-Davis, 
2006, chapters II and V; Ocampo, 2008). Regulation 
of  capital flows can create space for consistent and 
countercyclical exchange-rate and monetary policies 
simultaneously.
Extreme liberalization of external financing, like 
that introduced since the 1990s, entails integration 
into the most speculative segments of international 
financial markets. Consequently, the most dynamic 
segment of the capital market has been large-scale 
financial activity involving short-term inflows and 
outflows, characterized not just by its procyclical 
volatility but also by the tenuousness of its links with 
productive investment.
Regulation of the more volatile capital accounts 
can act as a countercyclical macroeconomic instrument, 
acting on boom and bust cycles right at their source. It 
can mitigate pressures for currency appreciation and 
make it possible to adopt contractionary monetary 
policies in periods of financial euphoria. Also relevant 
is that the use of precautionary regulations during 
booms subsequently creates space for expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policies in episodes like the 
global crisis.
At the same time, countercyclical regulation 
of  capital account inflows and outflows provides 
room for a reorganization of the domestic financial 
system aimed at channelling resources into productive 
investment with a bias towards inclusiveness, helping 
to reduce the structural heterogeneity between different 
economic and social sectors.
(b) National experiences with countercyclical 
measures
On the whole, experience with the use of 
restrictions on short-term or liquid capital inflows 
has shown them to play a useful role in creating 
space for countercyclical macroeconomic policies, 
thereby contributing to growth and employment 
(Ocampo, 2008; Stiglitz, 2000; Williamson, 2003). 
These restrictions are designed to create a more 
stable macroeconomic environment during booms 
and minimize costly recessionary adjustments in 
the retreat from positions of disequilibrium due to 
domestic overheating or external imbalance.
The success of the Chilean experience in the first 
half of the 1990s is a robust proof of the effectiveness 
of countercyclical regulations. Having recently returned 
to democracy, in 1990 Chile was confronted with a 
larger supply of external financing (relative to gdp) 
than other nations in Latin America, owing to its 
better economic performance, smaller economy and 
renewed political stability. This supply of funding was 
perceived by the authorities as an excess that would 
destabilize the country’s macroeconomy (particularly 
aggregate demand and its consistency with potential 
gdp and a sustainable external balance) and its 
export strategy.
Accordingly, the authorities regulated the amount 
and composition of capital inflows by adding to the 
cost of  short-term flows of  funds, whether in the 
form of credits or stock market investments. This was 
done by establishing a non-interest-bearing reserve 
requirement (encaje), calculated as a proportion of 
the gross flow and to be held at the central bank for 
a given period, the rate of  the encaje and period 
varying with the supply of  external funding. By 
regulating the composition and amount of inflows, 
the reserve requirement provided effective room for 
simultaneously implementing active countercyclical 
monetary and exchange-rate policies (Magud and 
Reinhart, 2006; Edwards and Rigobon, 2009). 
They allowed Chile to maintain a level of aggregate 
demand consistent with its productive capacity and 
a sustainable exchange rate. These equilibria led to a 
substantial increase in the investment ratio and in the 
potential and actual gdp growth rate, with average 
gdp growth exceeding 7% a year. In the second half  
of the 1990s, Chile went along with more fashionable 
policy thinking and allowed the regulatory power of 
the reserve requirement to weaken before liberalizing 
the capital account in 2001 (Ffrench-Davis, 2010c, 
chapters VIII and IX; Le Fort and Lehmann, 2003). 
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It thus fell victim to contagion from the Asian crisis 
in 1999 and saw its gdp growth rate drop from 7.1% 
in 1990-1998 to 3.8% in 1999-2008.
The region has had a great variety of experiences 
with capital account regulation. Controls on capital 
outflows, combined with large fiscal deficits and 
clearly overvalued exchange rates, are usually very 
inefficient and destabilizing. The purpose of  the 
capital account regulation proposed here is to achieve 
sustainable equilibria in the real macroeconomy, 
which is the opposite of  seeking to perpetuate 
imbalances. In pursuit of  these equilibria, some 
interesting regulatory experiments have recently 
been implemented in the region, largely to prevent 
excessive currency appreciation. Mention may be 
made of  the cases of  Argentina, Brazil, Colombia 
and Peru (eclac, 2009b).
Other regions can show many positive recent or 
current experiences with capital account regulation. The 
Republic of Korea is an example of an economy that 
maintained strict capital controls during a remarkable 
spell of economic growth lasting a third of a century. 
Following liberalization of capital inflows in the early 
1990s, which led to its 1998 crisis, the country has 
maintained controls on residents’ transfers of funds 
abroad (Mahani, Shin and Wang, 2005). Meanwhile, 
more traditional controls like those applied in China 
and India (such as bans on short-term financial 
borrowing, stock market investment quotas and 
controls on capital outflows) have proved very effective 
in achieving the macroeconomic objective of a more 
drastic weakening of the link between the domestic 
economy and the volatility of international markets 
(Ocampo, 2008). Both nations have successfully 
withstood the current crisis and their controls created 
the conditions for the remarkable recovery programmes 
now in operation.
In summary, reforms of  the Washington 
Consensus reforms are urgently needed and should 
give greater priority to the linkages of the financial 
system (both local financial markets and the capital 
account) with the domestic investment process and 
the domestic economy than to those with short-term 
external financial markets. They should also improve 
the stability of domestic demand and macroprices 
such as the exchange rate.
VII
The great macroeconomic challenge
These reflections come at a time when the world seems 
to have avoided what many analysts feared could have 
been a depression similar to that of the 1930s. That 
this did not occur was due not to good fortune or 
self-correcting markets, but to deliberate public action 
to correct the global macroeconomic situation. The 
correction ran counter to the dominant paradigm 
of  a passive State and neutral economic policies. 
The response of the world’s leading economies has 
been a vigorous countercyclical fiscal policy. With 
collapse avoided, fortunately for the great majority 
of the world’s population, the task now is to deal 
with what is still a recessive situation and complete 
a set of corrections, both in global institutions and 
in each of our countries.
This article has documented how the choice 
of  macroeconomic approach decisively affects the 
stability and speed of  growth, and influences the 
degree of equity built into the structure of domestic 
markets. National financial systems have a crucial 
role to play in capturing savings and allocating them 
to investment. Foreign capital, meanwhile, can play 
a valuable role as a supplement to local savings; the 
composition and stability of flows are crucial here. 
Indiscriminate financial liberalization proved highly 
inefficient as a way of achieving economic development 
and real macroeconomic stability and of reducing 
inequality. The global crisis —an example of the risks 
of unregulated “financierism”— has created space for 
more pragmatic policies and countercyclical regulation 
of the capital account in the region.
The way reform of national capital markets and 
their relationship with international capital markets is 
undertaken represents a critical challenge on the road 
to a sustainable macroeconomics that is conducive 
to economic and social development.
(Original: Spanish)
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